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ABSTRACT 
Good friendships improve our lives. But philosophers, psychologists, and other social scientists disagree about the nature 
of friendship and the value of virtual friendships. Recent technological advances and global crises highlight the importance 
of answering the question: can virtual friendships be good? We argue against accounts of friendship that suggest virtual 
relationships are necessarily deficient, focusing on rejecting the requirements of physical proximity and complete 
authenticity for friendship. We propose a more inclusive account of friendship that focusses on positive intentions and 
experiences. We also discuss examples of virtual friendships that highlight their advantages in modern times, especially 
their ability to promote intercultural cohesion. Finally, we suggest implications to help guide individual and collective 
decisions about friendship in a way that improves wellbeing.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers (Helm, 2009; Telfer, 1970), psychologists (Bayer, et al., 2018; Hojjat, et al., 2017), and others 
(Amichai-Hamburger, et al., 2013; Dunbar, 2018; Greco, et al., 2015) agree that friendship is an important 
contributor to wellbeing. But there is considerable disagreement about whether friendship is a central or 
peripheral component of wellbeing (Badhwar, 1993) and about what kinds of friendship are valuable (Anderson 
& Fowers, 2020; Badhwar & Dadlez, 2018). This disagreement is particularly noticeable for technologically 
mediated friendships (Danaher, 2019; Jeske, 2019; Munn, 2017). 
Having the right kind of friendships is important for living a good life. So, understanding whether the 
increasing availability of virtual friendships is an opportunity or a threat is vital for making the right individual 
and collective decisions about the kinds of friendships to seek and encourage in modern times. Recent events 
have made the importance of friendship even more obvious. COVID-19 forced governments to balance the 
costs and benefits of physically isolating their citizens. A widely-discussed potential cost was that physical 
isolation would entail social isolation, or at least the degradation of social interactions to the point at which 
people’s mental health was at risk (Courtet, et al., 2020; Marston, et al., 2020). Making the right decisions 
about enforced physical isolation depends on understanding both the importance of friendship for wellbeing 
and in what ways, if any, virtual friendships are less valuable than in-person friendships. For example, if virtual 
friendships are about as valuable as in-person friendships, then longer lockdowns combined with the facilitation 
and promotion of virtual communication technologies may be preferable to shorter lockdowns with the 
associated risk of higher infection rates. 
In this paper, we argue that we can and do value virtual interactions and virtually mediated friendships. In 
the process, we propose an inclusive definition of friendship that is at odds with many recent views on the 
topic, highlight the benefits of virtual friendships and discuss the implications for individuals and societies. 
2. THE NATURE OF FRIENDSHIP 
Both philosophers (Leibowitz, 2018; Nehamas, 2016) and psychologists (Apostolou, et al., 2020; Johnson, et 
al., 2011) argue about the nature of friendship. Many philosophical accounts of friendship follow from 
Aristotle’s conception of friendship (Annas, 1988; Sherman 1987; Thomas, 1989). These point to the difficulty 
of establishing higher order friendships and claim that in virtual spaces, such friendships are more difficult or 
even impossible to establish (Cocking, et al., 2012; McFall, 2012; Sharp, 2012). More recent philosophical 
accounts (Elder, 2017; Laas, 2018; Turp, 2020), and some psychological accounts (Rawlins, 2016; Schønning, 
et al., 2020), argue that, while they may have some value, virtual interactions cannot be a foundation for proper 
friendships. This claim is most often supported by stressing virtual interactions’ lack of authenticity or 
physicality (e.g., Fröding & Peterson, 2012), features usually present in in-person interactions. We will argue 
against these restrictive accounts of friendship and the view that virtual interactions are necessarily deficient.  
Certain kinds of physicality, such as supportive hand-holding and loving embraces, may be a basic human 
need (Nussbaum, 1995). The importance of positive physical interactions seems to be most obvious during the 
developmental phase from infancy to adulthood (White, 2018). For example, in a study of 53 mother-infant 
pairs, maternal touch was found to reduce infants’ physiological reactivity to stress, reducing their cortisol 
levels (Feldman, et al., 2010). But notice that positive human touch can be important for our wellbeing or 
development without it being a necessary part of the nature of friendship. Humans have long had important 
friendships with people they have never met in person. Long before anyone conceived of the internet, people 
regularly wrote letters to their pen pals in distant lands. It is reasonable to believe that some pen pals were good 
friends despite never interacting in person. Therefore, it is clear that physicality is not necessary for friendship. 
Fröding and Peterson (2012) argue that the people we interact with regularly online cannot become genuine 
friends because we cannot build authentic relationships with them. They claim that the temporally and modally 
restricted kinds of interactions we have online do not allow us to know the other person completely. If there 
are aspects of the other person we do not know about, Fröding and Peterson (2012) argue, then we cannot be 
friends with them. Rather, we would be under a kind of digitally enabled illusion. The person that we think we 
are friends with does not exist—they are a mere fragment of the complex whole of the real person you are 
having incomplete and inauthentic online interactions with. Fröding and Peterson’s (2012) argument is based 
on an Aristotelian account of friendship that requires complete honesty between two virtuous agents. Both 
complete honesty and the high bar Aristotle sets for who can claim to be a virtuous agent, make this account 
of friendship entirely unrealistic. If we took these requirements seriously, then there would be very few, if any, 
genuine friendships. Very few of us are fully virtuous—excellent in all the important human capacities. 
Similarly, the vast majority of people find it difficult to be honest with ourselves, let alone others (Nuzzo, 
2015). So, the argument that online friendships cannot be authentic fails because it sets the bar too high for 
authenticity—so high that very few if any in-person friendships would count. 
Thinking more carefully about inauthenticity, it seems that our biggest worry is our friends maliciously 
deceiving us. Lying to a friend so as to not ruin their surprise party seems like a beneficent lie, and certainly 
one that the friend would not chastise us for after the party. Malicious lies, on the other hand, would cause us 
great distress to hear about. The friend that lies about their intentions to be a reliable house-sitter would likely 
lose your friendship and the opportunity to sit your house if you overheard them telling others about the raging 
party they are planning for at your house while you are away. So, we might not know everything about a 
potential friend, but as long as they have positive intentions toward us, our lack of knowledge doesn’t appear 
to be a problem. 
Working the above arguments into the general understanding of the nature of friendship, we propose an 
inclusive definition of friendship: Friendship is a relationship constituted by a clear majority of positive 
interactions between parties with positive intentions toward each other. On our view, friendships can be non-
physical and even inauthentic, but only if those features do not lead to more negative interactions or negative 
intentions between the parties to the friendship. Our conception of friendship is distinct from others in the 
literature (Annas, 1987; Elder, 2017; Laas, 2018, Fröding & Peterson, 2012) both in that it allows for shared 
activity via online (as well as in-person) interaction and in that it relies on intention, rather than physical 
interaction, to instantiate the appropriate friendship-relations.  
3. THE VALUE OF VIRTUAL INTERACTIONS AND FRIENDSHIPS 
The risks of virtual interactions are discussed frequently, often at the expense of the potential benefits. For 
example, commentators frequently worry about the exposure of [usually young males] to violence via online 
gaming (Furlow, 2017; Huesmann, 2007) But they do not consider the opportunities such gaming can provide 
for leadership, friendship formation, exposure to people of different cultural and religious backgrounds, and so 
on. 
In person, it is hard for teenagers to reach beyond their immediate social circle. A 14-16-year-old will have 
very few opportunities, if any, to interact in person with adults outside of their immediate family. They may 
talk to teachers, but the teacher-student relationship is an explicitly unequal one. Online, by contrast, the 
importance of age is diminished as it is often unknown. So, in many online endeavours, such as playing World 
of Warcraft with other guild members (Munn, 2012), these teenagers have interactions as equals with people 
from outside their age cohort. As age becomes irrelevant, positive virtual interactions can lead to friendships 
between teenagers and adults.  
Virtual friendships do not rely on physical cues, and they draw from a much wider pool of potential friends 
than do in person friendships, which are of necessity restricted to those in physical proximity to oneself. In 
addition to the broader age cohort outlined above, virtual friendships also offer the benefit of exposing those 
engaging in them to unfamiliar cultures, beliefs, and religions. There is evidence to suggest that a major 
component of reducing prejudice is exposure to other cultures, so online interactions are then valuable in 
making us better people (Turner, et al., 2007; Vezzali, et al., 2014).  
4. IMPLICATIONS 
As virtual friendships become ubiquitous, the diversity of the average friend group is likely to expand, and in 
doing so, the frequency and intensity of prejudice against unfamiliar others in society will decline, simply 
because more people are exposed more often to others of more divergent backgrounds, than was or is the case 
in predominantly physical interaction. The benefit to society of this is clear. A society in which people develop 
a more diverse range of friendships with a heterogenous cohort of friends will be more accepting of difference 
than one which is restricted to traditional social structures. 
If our analysis of the value of online friendships—that they are just as valuable as physical friendships, and 
have additional advantages which physical friendships do not—is correct, then by embracing online friendship, 
and by enabling and encouraging others to do so, we will lay the groundwork for a stronger, more resilient 
society, both in general, and in particular in times when physical interaction is curtailed by forces beyond our 
control. Furthermore, worries about virtual friendships taking time away from in-person friendships can be 
viewed as unfounded, not because it won’t happen, but because it won’t matter. Virtual friendships are not 
inferior, they are just a convenient kind of friendship. 
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